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Abstract 
This paper describes ongoing research and development aimed at creating a trustworthy software-based model 
called the Persona Concept.  The “Persona Architecture” uses “web services” to implement this model and is 
designed to provide the consumer direct control over their identity, credentials and private data.  Credentials are 
expressed as third-party assertions encapsulated in certificates using Secure Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 
and are digitally signed. The architecture also supports distributed management of electronic credentials and aims 
at operating across various fixed and mobile platforms including cell phones and wireless Portable Digital 
Assistants(PDA’s).  
 
Introduction 
Although authentication systems are meant to serve both users and web service providers (WSPs), implementations 
have not always respected the privacy needs and rights of the individual consumer.  This paper introduces a concept 
and strategy aimed at better serving individual e-business users.   The motivation for this work comes from our 
observation that despite best intentions, the web offers little direct control or accountability to the consumer over 
their personal and private data. For example, the FBI recently exposed a major identity theft, reported in [14] and 
[15] where it was estimated that up to 30,000 consumer identities were stolen from a credit bureau and used to 
produce millions of dollars worth of fraudulent transactions.  
Consumer privacy is currently in the hands of the web service providers they use.  Although the branded web 
service providers may be trusted in most cases, they too are subject to hacking, viruses and mistakes.  And there are 
plenty of WSPs that do not take proper care or are not aware of the privacy rights or concerns of the consumer and 
their obligations to protect consumer data.  Therefore, the more web services a given consumer uses, the greater the 
exposure is likely to be.   
The good news is that the power of the web has the potential of increasing control and privacy of user data.  We 
have already seen technologies like SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) [1] and PGP (Pretty Good Privacy [2] implement 
security effectively on the web.  However, fully deployed PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) [3] and SET (Secure 
Electronic Transactions) [4] have not lived up to promises or predictions – mostly to do with the complexity of 
deployment we think.   
More recently, SSO (Single Sign-On) solutions like MS Passport [5] have been attempting to address some of the 
problems. And several companies have banded together recently to develop the SAML (Secure Assertion Markup 
Language) [6] to support an open web interoperability standard. 
 
The Persona Concept 
“Persona” has sometimes been used to represent a user’s profile in cyber space.  It has also been used to denote a 
software agent or assistant interacting with the user to provide advice while brokering web transactions [12].  Our 
own usage is akin to the first two examples and is not aimed at modeling an individual per the latter example.  On 
the contrary, our Persona concept focuses on providing the user with control over her personal profile maintaining 
and tracking her identification, authentication, authorization, security assertions (credentials) and other privacy data. 
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We consider the persona to be an active software agent that encapsulates private and personal data and performs a 
range of authentication and personalization services on behalf of its owner.  It its most broad incarnation, the 
persona carries out tasks ranging from user authentication and provisioning of credentials to WSPs, through to 
personalization and customization activities such as channel selection, user interface adaptation, auto web form 
filling and automated searching and bidding.  In this paper we will restrict our persona discussions to authentication, 
credential handling and accountability mechanisms for the most part.  Fig. 1 illustrates the conceptual framework for 
the persona.   
Remark: The Persona will be deployed on the user’s PC and 
replicated on his/her cell phone, PDA or on a host computer at work, 
at work, at the bank or on a web service provider.  Such a distributed 
Persona will need to have its copies synchronized in a secure and 
efficient manner.  To support off-line access, say from a site with a 
need to access certain persona data, adequate permissions and 
protection features will need to be provided.  Hence the Persona will 
need strong tamper resistance, access controls and intrusion detection 
mechanisms.     
An over-riding purpose of a persona is to provide direct control over 
its owner’s personal and private data.  This personal agent 
encapsulates personal identification, authentication, credentials and 
other personal data and exposes selected information to web service 
providers on a strictly enforced need-to-know basis.  If possible, the 
Persona should also track where, when and what data has been left in 
the care of web service providers accessed by its owner.  This will 
allow the user to keep data updated at all WSPs of concern and also 
support follow-up when privacy misuse and/or abuse are suspected.  
Figure 1.  
 
Single Sign-On and MS Passport 
SSO is meant to simplify web access by requiring only a single user ID and password.  Kerberos [15] is perhaps the 
first such SSO model.  It mitigates the problem of remembering many passwords and reduces the vulnerability of 
using the same password to access many web services.   
Single sign-on systems attempt to address these problems.  MS Passport [5] and the Liberty Alliance Project [7] are 
highly visible SSO initiatives worth tracking at this time.  Instead of requiring users to establish separate identities 
and authentication mechanisms for every web service they may use, users register with an SSO authentication server 
using a single user ID and password.   
Unfortunately, single sign-on does not necessarily totally solve the problem.  Provided the authentication server is 
highly trusted and cannot be impersonated, and provided access between the user and the authentication server 
cannot be penetrated, SSO is indeed an improvement over poor password management by the user.  However, 
several authors [8] and [9] have already provided sufficient evidence that MS Passport is indeed vulnerable to 
certain types of misuse and attack and may indeed offer a false sense of security.  High-jacked sessions, masquerade, 
web site penetration attacks and unattended login sessions can compromise MS Passport and potentially expose all 
of a given user’s web accounts.  We understand that Microsoft has reacted to plug several of weaknesses brought to 
their attention so far.  Microsoft received a raft of negative publicity in 2002.  Some of them voiced deep concerns 
about the prospects of putting so much private information into the hands of a major private corporation like 
Microsoft. 
Meanwhile, the Liberty Alliance Project [7] seems to be addressing many of the shortcomings of MS Passport while 
avoiding the single caretaker model.  However, it introduces new concepts such as trust circles and federations that 
users and organizations will need to embrace for this model to gain a large following. 
 
Public Key Technologies 
For more than 10 years, public key (a.k.a. asymmetric key) technologies have made enormous positive contributions 
to security over the web.  Most notably, SSL has become a critical mechanism for providing levels of trust that have 
enabled web-banking and on-line credit-card processing over the last few years.  SSL is a key to enabling 
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technology for both MS Passport and Liberty Alliance.  Companies such as VeriSign, have become de facto 
commercial Certificate Authorities (CA), are conducting basic due diligence and providing signed digital certificates 
to qualifying web service companies.   
PKI, and the SSL as implemented by most web browsers, is designed to support 2-way authentication.  Yet most 
web sites support only 1-way authentication.  This is most likely because of the required knowledge and relative 
complexity for a user to obtain a digital certificate. 
 
Conceptual Requirements for the Persona 
The Persona Concept endeavors to achieve the benefits of SSO while employing the strengths of PKI to support web 
authentication and management of the consumer’s identify, credentials and other private data.   
We have chosen to model the persona agent in object-oriented terms identifying the key use cases.  We will begin 
with an overview of the requirements as we see them.  Although we are distinguishing between mandatory and 
desirable requirements with “shall” and “should” respectively, this paper presents a work in progress and the 
identified requirements are subject to ongoing refinement and change.    
Persona Data 
The persona shall contain data items such as identity, passwords, certificates / credentials, user profile data, ewallet 
information and personal preferences.   
Identity, Authentication and Authorizations 
A given persona instance for a user shall contain a unique and widely accepted identifier associated with the persona 
owner – normally the full legal name.  Aliases may be useful to support.  Private authentication code(s) bound to the 
persona identifier, such as passwords or private keys, shall be supported.  Authorizations asserting various 
capabilities attributed to the persona owner shall be recorded in the persona in the form of credentials.  The persona 
shall also be capable of supporting the authentication of web services by obtaining and maintaining related 
authentication data such as digital certificates.  The persona shall also be capable of providing the owner’s profile, 
personalization and other authorizations and credentials to web service providers on a need-to-know basis. 
Controlling Access to Persona Data 
Access control rules are typically expressed in the form of a security policy.  In the context of the persona, the 
implementation of the security policy by the persona shall mediate access to persona data by external services and 
users.  In other words, it will decide which persona data elements to expose to given web service providers and 
collaborating users. 
Selected credit card information may be made to be explicitly available to designated web service providers.  
Personal information, such as meeting times and locations, may be made available to designated collaborating users.  
User preferences may be made available to specific application programs (e.g. for form filling and message routing).     
Multi-Channel Access Support 
The persona owner shall be free to transact with any WSP or any user of its choosing on the web.  The user shall be 
able to employ PCs, laptops, cell phones and/or PDAs at home, at work or at some other location such as an Internet 
café (such PCs may need access to persona data but should leave none behind.  
These devices may or may not be capable of supporting all persona data and capabilities.  Furthermore, there may be 
scenarios where persona data may not be stored on the device being used because of security and capacity reasons.  
Finally, to support off-line (autonomous) transactions, a user may wish to expose certain persona data to WSPs and 
collaborating users. 
The persona should therefore be capable of providing controlled and secure access to persona data directly from a 
WSP or collaborating user in accordance with owner-specified access control rules. 
Transaction Support 
The persona shall support both on-line and off-line transactions between the persona owner and external web service 
providers (i.e. consumer to business) and other users (i.e. consumer to consumer).   
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Accountability / Transaction Logging 
Ideally, the persona should be able to log all events.  Due to various implementation constraints, this may not be 
practical.  At a minimum the transaction log should be able to log the last access to any given site and accumulate a 
record of all persona data released to that site. 
Security and Trust 
As discussed above, an important objective is to be able to deploy a Persona copy on other host computers to 
provide redundancy and off-line asynchronous access including synchronization and update transactions for PDAs 
and cell phones.  Persona design and supporting system architecture must therefore address the following security 
and trust requirements: 
 tamper-proof according to trustworthiness of the host 
 positively authenticate the persona instance 
 prevent hijacking, masquerade and sniffing 
 provide secure channels between the persona and WSPs. 
 
Operational Requirements: Use Cases 
The operational requirements can be expressed in terms of use cases where the principle actors are the persona 
owner, external web service providers and collaborating users.  We are ignoring administrators and other possible 
actors at this stage.  
We are also assuming that the system design will need to incorporate multiple persona copies and/or fragments to 
support availability and reliability requirements, off-line transactions, and transactions from cell phones and PDAs 
including the following:  
 Create a Persona Instance 
 Maintain an Instance 
 On-Line (Synchronous-Pull) Access: 
 Authenticate Owner 
 Exchange Credentials 
 Exchange Other Private Data 
 Deploy Instances 
 Synchronize Instances 
 Off-Line (Asynchronous-Push) Access 
 Authenticate Transaction 
 Exchange Other Private Data 
 
Implementation Challenges 
The Persona will be implemented in the form of an object-oriented software agent.  User identity and attributes will 
be encapsulated and protected using encryption, an adapted form of PKI, digital signatures and access control lists.  
In addition, intrusion detection mechanisms will be used to detect and prevent tampering.  The implementation will 
provide controlled access to services supporting owner maintenance (update), web authentication, copy 
synchronization and backup.  The Persona will be designed to overcome deficiencies of current SSO and PKI 
architectures and will be designed for ease of deployment using web services, possibly SOAP.   
Persona Distribution 
It is apparent that the persona will need to be distributed to support availability, reliability, off-line operation and 
support for hand-held devices.  This suggests that a persona-based architecture will need to be logically integrated 
yet physically distributed.  The owner will need to be able to create and deploy persona components and as well as 
access and manage these components as if they were a single entity.   
Hosting and Accessing Components 
Given that the persona architecture will be distributed, the question of deployment of the persona components needs 
to be considered.  Our primary objective of giving the persona owner direct control motivates one to seek out an 
architecture that has the potential of providing that control.  The approach we are proposing is an open approach 
(something akin to the open software movement) based on the Simple Object Application Protocol (SOAP).  SOAP 
provides mechanisms for easy deployment on hosts using open source tools like Apache SOAP Server.   
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Interoperability 
For the persona concept to work, it must be capable of supporting the use cases identified above.  SOAP with 
WSDL will support transactions among persona components and between WSPs and persona components.  SAML 
has the potential of standardizing such transactions.   
Interoperability between WSPs and users will be more challenging.  This will require integration with browser 
technologies using cookies, URL query strings or accessing the browser APIs.  MS Passport, for example, uses 
encrypted cookies and encrypted URL query strings to co-ordinate authentication transactions. 
Persona Architecture 
Fig. 2 & fig. 3 illustrate two scenarios currently being studied.   Both of them assume that the persona is composed 
of two parts: a small Persona Client component on the user’s device that is integrated with the browser1; and a 
Persona Server component deployed on a trusted host.  These approaches may be compared to MS Passport, which 
accomplishes similar coordination by re-directing the user’s web browser from the web server, to the authentication 
server, and then back to the web server again. 
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Scenario 1: Persona Data Routed through User’s Device
1. User connects to WSP through their browser
2. WSP launches SSL session and user authenticates WSP
3. WSP launches an authentication request which is received by the Persona Client
4. If user has been inactive, Persona Client authenticates user with ID + password
5. Persona Client contacts Persona Server & retrieves required authentication + other persona data
6. Persona Client delivers authentication data & other persona data (credit card #, credentials etc).
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Figure 2. 
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Scenario 2: Persona Data Access Directly by the WSP
1. User connects to WSP through their browser
2. WSP launches SSL session and user authenticates WSP
3. WSP launches an authentication request which is received by the Persona Client
4. If user has been inactive, Persona Client authenticates user with ID + password
5. Persona Client directs WSP to Persona Server for authentication data
6. WSP makes authentication request to Persona Server & receives persona data.  
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Figure 3. 
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The persona system architecture also incorporates a 
certification authority (CA) as is illustrated in Fig. 4.  
In addition to the above mentioned persona services, 
CA services will include the ability to provide CA 
and user certificates in response to user requests and 
to create, deliver and sign digital certificates for end-
users on request.  Both the CA and the Persona will 
be hosted using SOAP services to provide open but 
protected access.   
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 For example, IE, Netscape, AvantGo for PDAs and HDML or WAP for cell phones. 
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Research Plans 
The work to date has focused on persona requirements and alternative technologies, standards and models.  We have 
conducted a preliminary investigation of existing and emerging technologies and standards and have begun to 
examine various usage scenarios. Our next steps will include conducting a more in-depth analysis of architectural 
alternatives and security mechanisms; developing prototypes of software agents; and assessing the performance and 
security properties of these alternatives. 
Summary 
The persona concept has been specifically designed to provide functions and features that will empower the 
consumer.  The consumer’s identity, credentials and other private date are stored in persona components and 
maintained by persona agents.  Credentials are expressed as third-party assertions, encapsulated in certificates using 
SAML and digitally signed.  The Persona Architecture uses SOAP to implement “web services” for certificate 
issuing, exchange and authentication among consumer devices, certificate issuers, persona agents and web service 
providers. 
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